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Patent Donations and Tax Policy
Xuan-Thao Nguyen and jeffrey A. Maine*

The charitable tax deduction h istorically served as a vital tool for the transfer of
tech nology, encouraging corporations to donate patents to research universities
an d other nonprofit donees. In a prime example, Boeing donated to Vander
bilt University a patent that covers a particle-separa tion technology, an advanced
version ofContinuous Flow Electrophoresis, with potential applications in nan
otechnology. Boeing also advanced a group of patents to the University of Penn
sylvania that could help treat bone diseases and injuries. In another example,
DuPont donated its patents relating to zeolite catalysts for further chemical and
materials research to Michigan State University. The company also gave the
University of California at San Diego a group of paten ts relating to the adh esive
technology called Tacky Dot® that has applications ranging from flat-panel dis
plays to pollution ab atement. The Kellogg Company donated its patents relating
to functional foods and consumer packaging. And Eastman Chemical Company
provided patents to the University of South Carolina that would use the tech
n ology as the cornerstone for its new NanoCenter. Unfortunately, the practice
of patent donations like these is in jeopardy. Because of recent tax legislation
targeting patent donations, the subject of this chapter, the charitable deduction
system may no longer serve as a vital technology transfer tool.
Federal patent law and fede ral tax law should work together to benefit society
as a wh ole by facilitating the progress of science. U.S. pa tent law provides patent
holders monopolistic rights vis-a-vis the significant legal protections for patents
for a limi ted time. 1 Federal tax law allows most taxpayers to immediately recover
the costs of their inventions, despite the fac t that these properties have long
p rotectible lives un der patent law. 2 While both patent an d tax laws promote
' Copyright© 2006 Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine. This chapter was adapted from Xuan
Thao N. Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Giving Intellectual Property, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1721
(2006).
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socially desirable inventive activities, additional tax incentives are needed to
encourage the dissemination of technologies to the public for the maximum
social good. To achieve the policy goals of ultimate innovation, the government
should provide incentives to encourage the patentees to donate, rather than
abandon, their "orphan" patents to universities, hospitals, and other nonprofit
organizations with research and development facilities that can properly exploit
the patents.
We advocate for the implementation of incentives that would encourage
donors to surrender their monopolistic ownership of patents for the benefit of
charitable organizations and, in tum, the development and growth ofsociety. We
begin by exploring the trend ofcharitable giving and the impact oftechnology on
postmodem philanthropy. The next section discusses the importance of paten~
in the global, knowledge-based economy and demonstrates the benefit ofoutright
ownership of patents by charitable donees. Although th is section recognizes that
the present tax system requires patent donors to make complete assignments to
charities to obtain tax benefits, it demon strates that the present sys.t em does no~
adequately encourage donors to make outright gifts to charity.
The chapter then critiques recently enacted legislation that targets patent
charitable donations. It argues that the current regime fails to incentivize socially.
desirable donations by eliminating any immediate financial incentives for patent
charitable donations. This section identifies several problems with th e regime!s
fo~us on postcontribution economic incentives, which negatively favors incom~
generating patents over other forms and favors commercially driven donees over .
educational donees and other donees committed to basic science research. Th¢
chapter concludes by proposing a system based on immediate economic ince.o-.
tives. To achieve optimal social giving, we propose an elective deduction regiin.e.
whereby patent donors may choose to real ize immediate tax benefits upon contii"'
bution or to enjoy deductions in postcontribution years to the extent the charitabl~
donee generates income from the patent property.

THE ART OF GIVING

Giving takes many forms. People give their time and talent to volunteer at
community centers, hospitals, churches, and schools. Some devote years oftheir
lives to missionary works; to volunteer in such organizations as the Peace Corps,
AmeriCorp, and Habitat for Humanity; and to serve in the mili tary on missions
that vary from peacekeeping to humanitarian aid. Others decide to donate their
prized collections of art and artifacts to their institutions of choice.
All charitable donations, ranging from the small daily acts ofgiving to orga
nized philanthropic efforts, benefit society. 3 Accordingly, charitable giving has
been central to the United States and its national character for cenl;uries.4 In the
earliest days of European settlement, John Winthrop told the Puritans sailing to
the Massachusetts Bay Colony that, to succeed in the new land, they needed
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to be a model of Christian charity. 5 In the early nineteenth and twentieth cen
turies, the philanthropy of notables such as Peabody, Rockefeller, Carnegie, and
Ford left a strong imprint on society. George Peabody, rega rded as the founder
of modern philanthropy, was a remarkable New England in ternational banker
who became America's first great educational philanthropist.6 The Rockefeller
Foundation's gifts affected medical research, education, and public health in
Europe, the Soviet Union, and China from World War I through the cold war?
The industrialist Andrew Carnegie established the Carnegie Corporation ofNew
York in 191 1 to promote "the advancement diffusion of knowledge and u nder
standi ng," fundi ng p rojects in the areas of education , internation al peace and
security, international development, and the strengthening of U.S. democracy.8
Henry and Edsel Ford created the Ford Foundation with gifts and bequests to be
a resource for innovative people and institutions worldwide. 9
Furthermore, in the last twenty years, changes in technology have tremen
dously impacted virtually every aspect of the economy, society, and charitable
giving. 10 T echnological changes have facilitated the growth of private wealth
held by individuals and corporate entities. 11 Indeed, in the late 1990s, the Inter
net boom and robust economy were the key factors for the accumulation of per
sonal wealth . 12 Along with the new wealth came concerns about philanthropy. 13
Potential donors searched for optimum ways to give their accumulated wealth ,
and a new breed ofdono.rs was born. Multimillionaires and billionaires from the
technology industry approached philanthropy with venture capitalist principles,
seeking a maximum return ofsocial impact from thei r giving. 14 The Melin da and
Bill Gates F oundation, 15 for example, has surpassed the ph ilanthropic notables of
yesteryear, spearheading postrnodern philanthropy by directing the Gates's newly
accumulated wealth toward charitable giving. 16 In addition, technology-savvy
individuals have turned to the Internet and developed e-ph ilanthropy as a new
approach to maximize social good. 17
The wealth accumulate.d during this recent technological revolution has
spawned an increase in the number of charitable organizations. IS In 200 l , chari
table foundations reached record asset holdings,l 9 and, today, countless websites
offer advice to prospective donors, matching them with potential donees, projects,
and causes .20 A recent study showed that 49 percent ofAmericans volunteer their
time for civic activities, and nearly 75 p ercent of Americans m;tke fina ncial
contributions to charities.21 These donations to foundations, institutions, an d
organizations promote social welfare in various areas of philanthropy. 22
D ependent on charitable generosity, potential charitable donees search for
and court potential donors. As the role of government in public fun ding contin
ues to dimin ish, 23 nonprofit organ izations compete for private support to fu lfill
and expand their charitable m issions. 24 Private donation s are pivotal to offset the
sh rinking public funding of arts, science, social science, communications, ed
ucation, health, research, religion, and democracy.25 T h us, an incentives-based
system that facilitates giving is essential, not only to the donors and donees, but
also to the development and growth of society.

448

Patents and Trade Secre~

PATENTSAND THE BENEFIT OF CHARITABLE OWNERSHIP

Intellectual property, such as patents, has become increasingly important in
most sectors of the economy and society. 26 The rapid growth of technology and
information has enhanced companies' patent ownership portfolios, as compan~e~
seek to protect their rights in their inventions. 27 Moreover, as the economy haS: ·
become increasingly global and knowledge-based, the role ofintellectual property·
has become vitally important. 28 For example, the World Trade Organizatio(.(~
encompassing approximately 150 nations, 29 imposes upon all nation-member~ .
systematic protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights within th~ ·.
global free trade movements.30 Such a system indicates the role ofpatents, among ·
other intellectual property rights, in shaping the present and future direction
the global, knowledge-based economy. 31
To compete globally, the United States embraces a legal system of siTong
intellectual property rights. 32 Under U.S. intellectual property law, patents confer
ownership for twenty years from the date of filing the patent application.33 The
patent ownership encompasses the right to exclude others from making, using,
selling, offering for sale, or importing the patented invention. 34 The owner of a
patent is free to transfer all or part of the patent to others, and a transfer of patcn.L
ownership is recorded with the U.S. Patent Office. 35
Modern theorists regard the firm as the repository ofresidual property rights,
such as intangible intellectual property assets. 36 The firm may assign these resid
ual rights, such as patents, if it decides upon internal evaluation that they ilrc
no longer needed for the firm's functions in the market. In such cases, the firm
grants ownership in the intellectual property assets to an assignee-donee. 37 Donat
ing residual patents to charitable organ izations, such as educational and resea rch
institutions, enables the firm to control its competitors' access to those intellectual
property rights.
Moreover, as the new owner of a patent, the assignee enjoys all the righ t~
conferred under patent law.38 For example, if the charity is a un iversity, its
researchers, graduate students, and undergraduate students enjoy the right r·o
use the patent in their scientific investigation and study. 39 If the patent covers
a particular method, the university can conduct experiments using the method
without obtaining a license from the assignor. 40
Rather than assigning or donating the patent to a charitable organizatio11
altogether, the firm may alternatively execute a license to use the patent to a
charitable organization. A license is generally nothing more than a promise by
the licensor not to sue the licensee,41 as long as the licensee follows all tl•c
conditions set forth under the license agreement. 42 If the licensee, however, uses
the patent beyond the scope of the licel)se grant, the licensee is in breach of the
license and infringes the patent.43 Thus, to a charitable organization, having a
license, rather than owning a patent ouiTight, means having a restricted right to
use the patent with all the limitations described in the license agreement. 44
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These limitations may include the ability to use the patent only for cer
tain defined purposes,45 within identified laboratories belonging to particular
investigators, or for certain periods of time.46 Limits on the patent's purpose and
temporal and geographical limitations,47 among others, 48 may hinder investiga
tion and studies based on the subject patent if certain uses constitute a breach
of the license agreement and infringement on the patent. 49 Furthermore, costs
associated with patent litigation are exorbitant and may serve to reinforce the
licensee's fear of using the patent beyond the limitations. 5°
A license may generate other uncertainties and administrative burdens as
well. Who at the charity will negotiate the license agreement? Will that person
possess an understanding of all the limitations indicated in the license agreement?
Will that person be able to communicate the limitations to those who desire to
use the patent license in their investigation and study? Who will monitor the use
of the patent to insure compliance with the limitations? Most charitable organi
zations do not have technology transfer offices to handle patent incoming license
concerns,51 and even those organizations fortunate enough to have technology
transfer offices generally under staff such offices. 52
Most charitable organizations are unwilling or ill-equipped to deal with the
limitations and u ncertainties associated with the unattractive process ofobtaining
a license to use a patent. 53 Thus, many prefer to obtain the outright ownership of
the patent. 54 As an assignee, as opposed to a licensee, a charity has unrestricted
use of a patent, eliminating any uncertainties. Consequently, the charity can
limit costs incidental to obtaining a patent license or arising from the use of the
patent u nder the license agreement.
The outright assignment ofa patent means the charitable assignee possesses
its own portfolio of paten ts. The charity can use the donated patents to further
its own investigation and study that may lead to the creation of future inventions
and thus ownership of new patents. Moreover, the charity can then rely on its
own enhanced portfolio to attract new talents, funding, and investment. 55
Charitable donees clearly prefer to become assignees, rather than licensees
ofpatents, through outright gifts from donors. The question arises, then, whether
there is a system currently available to encourage the firm that would like to
completely assign its patents to a particular charity. 56 The current charitable
tax deduction scheme requires a donor to give its entire in terest (or undivided
interest) in donated property to a qualified charity. More specifically, no income
tax deduction is allowed for contributions ofpartial interests in property, defined
as an "interest in property which consists ofless than the taxpayer's entire interest
in such property." 57
W ith respect to donated patents, for example, a donor may not take a chari
table deduction if he or she retains any substantial righ t in the donated patent. In
order to qualify for an income tax charitable deduction under section 170 ofthe
Internal Revenue Code (Code), the taxpayer must transfer "all substantial rights"
in a patent, defined as "all rights which are of value at the time the rights to the
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patent are transferred." 58 In addition, a patent subject to a conditional reversion :~s
not deductible unless the likelihood of the triggering event occurring is so remote
as to be negligible. 59 Assume, for example, that a do11or's contribution ofa pat~Qt
to a university is contingent upon a certain professor remaining as a member Qf
the university's faculty for the rest ofthe patent's life, which is fifteen years. Und~~ ·
these facts, the donor would not be entitled to a charitable deduction becaUs:~
on the date ofthe contribution the possibility that the professor will no longer Qe
a member of the university's faculty for fifteen years is considered "not so remo.t¢
as to be negligible."6°
Although the tax system requires patent donors to make complete assignments
to charities to obtain any ded uction , the question arises whether the system
adequately encourages donors to make outright gifts to charity. Since owning
patents is equal to having a monopoly in those patents for a specific duration of
time, wh at are the driving factors persuading the firm, as the repository of residual
property rights, to surrender its monopoly? 61
Under the U.S. Constitution, th e owner of the patent and society have a
bargain: the owner enjoys the monopoly during a certain time period,62 and
society enjoys the patent once it becomes part of the public domain63 at the
conclusion of the time limit. 64 Why should the firm, as the repository of residual
property righ ts, give up its bargain prematurely, unless there are incenti ves to
faeilitate and encourage the ending of the monopoly and the transferring of the
ownership into the hands of charitable institutions~ 5 The firm could very wel l
enjoy the fruit of its ownership by ~elling the patent monopoly for its current
fair market value. By donating the patent asset, the firm forfeits the potential
i ncome generated by and from the asset. 66 Unless financial incentives exist tha t
reflect the value of the patent in the knowledge-based economy and thus serve
as a significant motivating force for donating, the firm will continue to keep the
monopoly u ntil the time limit expires. Charitable organizations will only be able
to obtain the benefits ofthe patenttl1rough the onerous process ofseeking licenses.
As a consequence, the charity and its charitable missions will be hindered, since
a license m ust be negotiated, permissions must be obtained, and limitations
dictated by the licensor must be obeyed .

OISINCENTIVIZING PATENT DONATIONS

Since 1917, the government has provided a financial incentive for taxp;1yers
to transfer money and property to charities by giving taxpayers an imme.<li:al~
tax deduction for t{ieir donations.67 Although this economic incentive has Q-e,erl.
costly from a federal revenue standpoint,68 promoting socially efficient donai{on§
represents sound policy. By encouraging p rivate philanthropy, the charit.t.bJ.~
deduc.tion minimizes the need for direct government subsidies to those orga!li~~{
tions, and prevents th e government from allocating subsidies as it sees fit. 69 .1.:he
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charitable deduction creates a more diverse, interesting society by a11owing tax
payers, many ofwhom are politically powerless, to choose and support particular
organizations they deem important. thereby advancing their own interests.1° By
encouraging private donations, the charitable deduction provision helps foster a
more ethical, moral society.71
As originally enacted in 1954, the charitable deduction provision contained
few limitations. To qualify for a charitable deduction, one had to make a money or
property contribution to a qualified charity.72 A "contribution" was interpreted as
a "voluntary transfer ofmoney or property made with no expectation ofprocuring
a fi na ncial benefit commensura te with the amount ofthe tran sfer."73 Services ren
dered to a charity were not considered property and, thus, did not qualify. 74 The
Code provided several categories of qualified orga nizations, including "certain
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, education" organizations.15 If a property
contribution was made to a qualified charitable donee, the amount of the contri
bution had to be determined. The charitabl e deduction provision, as originaHy
enacted, provided tha t the amount of a taxpayer's chafitable contribution was
generally the fair market value of the property contributed.16
By gra nting an immediate deductio n equal to the fair market value ofdonated
property, the charitable deduction provided an important econo mic incentive for
patentees to donate their patents to further c haritable organizations' activities. As
origin ally enacted, the charitable ded uction regime served as a vital tool for the
transfer of technology. Large corporations with research and development facil
ities often develop patents that later become inconsistent with their m issions or
core technologies, that are inappropriate for licensing to third parties, or that
have no value (for defensive purposes) in competitive markets. n Thus, the char
itable deduction provision in its original form encouraged research corporations
to dona te these "orphan patents" to universities with major scientific resea rch
programs in which the technologies could be properly exploited .78 Research
universities and other nonprofit donees were given the opportun ity to develop
poten tial new technologies, wh ile b usinesses avoided high patent maintenance
costs and received a charitable tax deduction equal to the fair market value of the
donated patents.
Dow C hemical, in a prime example of such a technology transfer, report
edly donated 10,000 paten ts to qualified charitable organizations over a five
year period .79 As patents became increasingly valuable and important to the
knowledge-based economy, the practice of donating patents flourished. Rather
than con tin uing to encourage such donations, however, the government has
scrutinized patent donations and imposed sta tutory requirements limiting patent
donation deductions.
Most recently, Congress enacted tax legislation in 2004 that substantially
altered the charitable deduction scheme for patents.80 In particular, the America n
Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (2004 Act) eliminates the fair market value standard
and reduces the amo unt a donor can deduct. The new legislation applies to most
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forms of intellectual property, including patents, certain copyrights, trademarks,
trade names, trade secrets and know-how, certain software, and similar intellectual
property or applications or registrations of such property.81
Forpatent contributions made on or after June 3, 2004, the 2004 Act limits the
charitable deduction amountto the lesser of the taxpayer's tax basis in the donated
patent or the fair market value of the patent at the time of the contribution.82 In
most cases, wherein patents appreciate in value, the lesser amount is the donor's.
tax basis. Often, the donor's tax basis in a patent is very small; in many cases, the.
donor's basis is zero because research and development costs are often deducteq
when incurred.83 As a result, the 2004 Act reduced or, in many cases, eliminate<;!.
an immediate tax deduction for gifts of patents.
Although the 2004 Act reduces or eliminates the initial charitable deductioi.l;·
it permits a donor to take additional charitable deductions in later years base~
on a certain percentage of the donee's income attributable to the patent. 84 Mor.e
specifically, a donor is allowed additional deductions for a limited number ·of
years based on a specified percentage of the qualified donee income receive.d
or accrued by the charity from the donated patent itself, rather than incom~
stemming from the activity in which the donated patent is used. 85 "Qualified
donee income" is defined specifically as "any net income received by or accrue-4 :
to the donee wh ich is properly allocable to the qualified intellectual property.;'·8~
For purposes of these future deductions, "qualified intellectual froperty" doe$.
not include intellectual property donated to a private foundation. 7
The amount of the additional deduction a taxpayer may take each year :I$
determined using a sliding-scale percentage of qualified donee income receiv~d
or accrued by the charity that is allocable to the property.88 The percentag.~
~ecreases each year, for a period of twelve years. 89 In the first and secon d ye~t~
after the contribution, a taxpayer can deduct 100 percent of the qualified dort~e
income.90 In year three, a taxpayer can deduct 90 percent of the qualified done,e
income.91 Moreover in year ten, the taxpayer can deduct only 20 percent of.the
qualified donee income.92
In order to qualify for an additional deduction in a future year, the aggregate
of the amounts calculated using the sliding-scale must exceed the amount of the
initial deduction claimed in the year of the contribution.93 Additional cha ritable
deductions are not allowed with respect to any revenues or income received or
accrued by the donee after the expiration of the legal life of the patent.94 Addi
tional charitable deductions are also not available when patents are contributed
to a private foundation (other than a private operating foundation or certain other
Code section 170(b )(1 )(E) private foundations).95
The 2004 Act was intended to curb improper charitable tax deductions re
sulting from overvaluations of donated patents and other forms of intellectual
property.96 Before enactment of the 2004 Act, the amount of a charitable deduc
tion in connection with the donatiof! of inteHectual property was equal to the
fair market value of the intellectual property at the time of the contributicm, sub
iect to certain exceptions.97 The government defined "fair market value" as "tJ1e
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price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a
willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having
reasonable knowledge ofrelevant facts."98 The government, however, never fully
articulated or formalized a standard or approach for determining the fair market
value of donated intellectual property. As a consequence, valuation conflicts be
tween donors and the government increasingly occurred as intellectual property
grew in value and the practice of intellectual property donations also grew.
As valuation abuses became more common, the government began to scru
tinize intellectual property donations and impose statutory requirements lim
iting intellectual property donation deductions. In its first major attack on in
tellectual property donations, Congress took significant measures to curtail the
availability of immediate tax benefits for contributions of copyrights by creators.
Internal Revenue Code section l70(e), added by the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
reduced the amount of the charitable deduction from fair market value to the
creator's basis in the copyright (out-of-pocket expenses that had not previously
been deducted).99 In many cases, copyright creators have a zero basis in their
copyrights, as "qualified creative expenses" are immediately deductible and do
not have to be capitalized. 100 As a result, the 1969 amendment precluded copy
right donors &om enjoying an y immediate financial benefit from their charitable
donations.
The 1969 amendment, in contrast, had little impact on patent donations. A
patent donor who transferred all substantial rights in the patent would generally
get a deduction equal to the full fair market value of the patent. 101 By retain
ing a fair market value deduction for patent donations, but not for copyright
donations, patent donations continued to flourish in the aftermath of the 1969
amendment. 102 In the late 1990s, patents became increasingly valuable assets and
important to the knowledge-ba'sed economy.103 The fair market value standard
appealed to the new breed of donors who approached philanthropy with venture
capitalist principles, .seeking maximum financial return from their giving. 104
The fair market value standard, however, also spawned valuation abuses by
patent donors.l 05 In 2003, the Internal Revenue SeiVice (IRS) announced its in 
tent to scrutinize questionable deductions of intellectual property contributions
and to enforce requirements and limitations on paten t donation deductions. 106
The plan, released in Notice 2004-7, included a multipronged attack on donors,
promoters, and appraisers. Notice 2004-7 stated that "some taxpayers that transfer
patents or other intellectual property to charitable organizations are claiming
charitable deductions in excess of the amounts to which they are entitled" and
warned that "the SeiVice intends to disallow improper charitable deductions
claimed by taxpayers in connection with the transfer of patents or other intellec
tual property to charitable organ izations." 107
Although the no.tice announced the government's enforcement campaign
against and planned attack on donors, promoters, and appraisers, it provided
little guidance on the proper method of computing a patent's fair market value.
According to the notice, "the fair market value of a patent must be determined
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after taking into account" factors including"( l) whether the patented technology
has been made obsolete by other technology; (2) any restrictions on the done·<{~:
use of, or ability to transfer, the patented technology; and (3) the length of tix:n,e,
remaining before the patent's expiration." 108
Unfortunately, the IRS's enforcement campaign regard ing patent donations;
announced in 2003, n ever got off the ground. It was rendered moot when, l~
than a year later in the 2004 Act, Congress hastily eliminated the fair mark~t
value standard for contributions of most forms of intellectual property, including
patents.l09 By eliminating the fair market value standard, the 2004 Act reduG'~~
the number ·o f negligent and intentional overvaluations of patent donations a.nd,~
correspondingly, reduces the administrative costs and burdens associa ted Wifu
overvaluations of donated patents. In addition, the 2004 Act is expected to gex;t,.,
erate hundreds ()f millions of dollars in additional federal revenue each year}l9
However, the greater policy issue, one that has been overlooked by Congress, k
whether it adequately incentivizes socially desirable patent donations to further
charitable goals.
Advantages of System Based on Immediate Economic Incentive

A fair market value measuring rod for charitable deductions allows doni;>ts·tq
en joy an immediate tax benefit equal to the fair market val ue ofdonated irtt~l1e~"
tual property, even though such donors are not required to report in their incQ't,il¢
the difference between the fair market value of the donated intellectual property
and the original out-of-pocket costs or unrecovered basis in them. 111 By elimi
nating any immediate financial benefits for intellectual property contributions,
the 2004 Act will have a drama tic impact on in-kind donations of inteilectual
property not targeted by the 1969 Act.ll 2
Indeed, it has been predicted that the ch aritable deduction system w.ill no
longer serve as a vital technology transfer tool. Potential patent donors, for iil
stance, will undoubtedly opt to abandon their inventions under the n.ew law,
rather th an contribute them to charities as was common under the old law. As
one commentator predicted, "80-90% of the brainpower ofthe U.S. will be left·on
corporate shelves." 113 According to th e Intellec tual Property Owners Association,
eliminating a fair market value deduction will "effectively end the opportunity
for academic and scientific professionals at nonprofit research institutions and
universities to develop valuable technologies acquired through patent donations
from U.S. companies for which the tech nology is no longer a part oftheirstJ:ategic
b usiness plans." 114
The predicted decline in in-kind charitable giving of intellectual property,
particularly patents, will most likely prove accurate when one considers tl1e
dramatic impact that the Tax Reform Act of 1969 had on copyright do~a,tlohs by
copyright creators. As discussed above, the 1969 Act eliminated the fair.market
value approach for donations of copyrights by copyright Cfeators. 115 After the
amendment, far fewer gifts were made by writers, artists, and photographers to
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museums, libraries, universities, and other charitable organizations.116 Libraries
and museums, in particular, reported significant reduc tions in an d, in some cases,
complete losses ofgifts from n oted authors, composers, an d artists.
The Museum of Modem Art in New York, for example, reportedly received
321 gifts from artists in the three years prior to the 1969 amendment, but only
twenty-eight gifts from artists in the three years following the amendment- a
90 percent decrease. 117 Another account shows that the M useum of Modem Art
received forty-seven gifts from artists in the year 1969, but only one gift in the
two years follow ing the 1969 amendment. liS T he Library of Congress, which
annually rece ived fifteen to twenty large gifts of manuscripts from authors prior
to 1969, received only on e gift in the four years after the 1969 amendment. 119
More strikingly, whereas the Library ofCongress annually received a total of230
self-created musical manuscrip ts and 179,000 self-created literary manusc ripts
before 1969, it received none in the two years following the 1969 amendment. 120
M any of the musicians and artists who planned to date their papers and artworks
to the Library of Congress in stead sold them after the 1969 amen dmen t.J21
Under the 2004 Act, for a charity to obtain ownership of a patent and for a
don or to receive any im mediate tax b enefit, the patent owner would have to sell
the patent to a third party, pay a tax on resulting gain, and then contribute the after
tax cash to th e ch aritable organization . T he charity, in turn, wou ld have to use the
donated cash to attempt to purchase the patent from the third party purchaser.
Most patent owners and charities woul d not engage in such man euvering; the
related transactiona l costs and the risk that the charity may not be able to obtain
the patent upon accep table terms and conditions would be too high in most cases.
Moreover, as noted by one commentator, corporate inventors would not have an
in centive to sell their patents an d contribute after-tax cash beca use corporations
pay federal income tax at the same rate on long-term capital gains and ordinary
income. 122 Companies .only have an incentive to make an in-kind donation of a
patent, rather than sell the patent and don ate the after-tax proceeds. 123
Although the new legislation has eliminated an immediate deduction for
charitable patent contributions, it does permit donors to take future deductions if
a donated patent generates income t o the ch aritable donee.124 The government
presumably believes that a charitable contribution system , solely providing donors
with u ncertain, declining, fu ture economic incentives will adequately encourage
patent donations. But th is premise is flawed. Even if a ch aritable donee licenses
a donated patent, the potential futu re deduction s will not be substantial.
First, it may take a charity several years before it receives any financial return
on "a donated patent. As the patent begins to generate increasing royalty revenues,
however, the amount of the charitable deduction under the 2004 Act declines
by use of a sliding-scale percentage (the percentage decreases each year for a
lim ited time period). Indeed, j n the tenth postcontribution year, the donor may
deduct only 20 percent of the income generated by the patent. As noted by one
commentator, "T hat's really not any great incentive for a corporation to spend its
time digging through its patents." 125
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The 2004 Act is inconsistent with the government's historical approach of
encouraging e.conomic an d socially desirable behavior through immediate tax
benefits. As the government is well aware, what incentivizes behavior is a system of
immediate economic benefits, rather than a system ofspeculative future benefits
under an accrual approach. Indeed, tax law is replete with instances in which
taxpayers are given immediate tax breaks to encourage desirable behavior. 126
For example, to encourage innovation, Code section 174 permits a taxpayer
to immediately deduct research or experimental expenditures when they are in
curred, rather than deduct such costs over the useful life or legally protected life.
of the resulting patent. 127 Providing an immediate tax deduction for desirable
research and development is clearly inconsistent with the government's goal of
matching income and the expenses that produced the income. 128 Nevertheless,
immediate economic incentives are seen as necessary means to achieve a com~
peting, higher policy e nd: to encourage the d evelopment of new technologies to;
drive economic growth.
To further illustrate, many costs incurred in the development of computet
software do not satisfy the definition of research and experimental expenditures
un der section 174 and would seemingly be nondeductible. 129 Nevertheless, ~Q
encourage computer software development, the government permits softw<:~.r~
developers to immediately deduct the costs of developing computer softwa:te-,
whether the software is patented or copyrighted. 130 In teres.tingly, the governme~t
has chosen to adopt a broad definition of "computer software" to encourag~
software development activities.m ,
With respect to these examples (patent and software development), the gov.-.
ernment recogn izes that financial incentives, provided to taxpayers with certainty
and immediacy, are more effective than financial incentives provided on an uri"'
certain, delayed basis. Therefore, to achieve optimal inventive and development
activities, the government has adopted a system of immediate economic inceti.:
tives. Ironically, with the 2004 Act, the government has taken an inconsistel;it
approach in ach ieving the dissemination of innovation for social good .
Although the 2004 Act eliminated any immediate economic incentive £9~
inventors to donate their patents by providing donors with only uncertain ful:)lte
benefits in return for their donations, it has kept in place an immediate econoro:h::
incentive for outright cash gifts and most real estate gifts. Such retention .i~,
perhaps, a result of the failure to acknowledge the significant shift in the level Q~
importance from tangible, physical property to intangible property. It is a genex~l
reflection of the "legal and business uncertainty" associated with intanglbl¢5;
as noted by Alan Greenspan, former C hairman of the Federal Reserve Boa~d.
According to Greenspan:
[T]his uncertainty derives from the fact that intellectual property is importantly
different from physical property. Because they have a material existence, physical
assets are more capable of being defended by police, the militia, or private
mercenaries. By contrast, intellectual property can be stolen by an act as simple
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as broadcasting an idea without the permission of the originator. Moreover, one
· individual's use ofan idea does not make that idea unavailable to others for their
own simultaneous use. 132

As intangible property has gained importance in the modern economy and
society, new legislation must respond accordingly.

Disadvantages of a System Based Solely on Future Economic Incentives
The current ch aritable deduction regime for patents, based solely on specu
lative, future economic incentives, raises several pol icy concerns. Although the
new law has attempted to achieve horizontal equity by treating patent and copy
right donors alike, 133 it also favors income-generating patents over patents that do
not produce income. The new law essential ly separates patent donation s into two
groups: money-making and non-money-making. The inherent implication from
such a dichotomy is that patents used for fundamental or purely sc ien tific re
search are not as valu able as patents that are used in applied research . 134 Applied
research often leads to commercialization, whereas the ma in motivation for fun
damen tal or pure research is for the advancement ofkn owledge. 135 Favoring one
type of patent over another based solely on its capability for generating money
shows that the government fails to comprehend th at both types of intellectual
property are imp ortant.
[M]ost scientists believe that a basic, fundamental understanding 6f all branches
of science is needed in order for progress to take place. In other words, basic
research lays the foundation for the applied science that follows. If basic work is
done first, then applied spin-offs often eventually result from this research.136

Moreover, the new law favors commercially driven donees over other donees.
The commercially driven donees are those that can use the patent in ways that
will d irectly genera te income.l11e troublesome implication from such favoritism
is that donees that emphasize education and basic research are n ot as worthy as
the commercially driven donees because their utilization of donated patents
will not directly generate income. This favoritism also rewards donees that are
endowed with the physical fac ilities, financ ial resou rces, and personnel capability
to exploit patents solely for direct fina ncial resul ts. 137 In other words, the n ew law
favors the "have-donees" over the "have-not donees." This may serve to create and
perpetuate the imbalance between the two groups of donees for patent don ations.
U ltimately, the new law places the b urden on donors to search for donees
capable of utilizing patents for the direct production of in come. Donors m ust
conduct their own research and due diligence to determine, with a very high
degree of certainty, wh ether a particular donee will use the patent donation
directly to yield monetary resul ts. The new law assu mes that all patent donations
have inh erent earning potential that can be translated into immediate income
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for the donees. However, this assumption is false because many donated patents
are orphan and have very little immediate commercial value. 138 If these paten ts
are commercially valuable, the donors would keep and u se the patents for their
own benefit. 139 After all, the creators and owners of these patents are often more
capable of exploiting the patents than the potential donees are. 140 Furthermore,
donors could have sold a valuable patent and given the money or part of it to
donees, rather than make an in-kind charitable donation.
It is bad policy to create tax law that fuvors money-generating patent dona
tions over non-money-generating patent donations, as both types of donations
contribute to society as a whole. The increased burden placed on donors to find
commercially driven donees is unwise, and many potential donors may ch oose
to allow these patents to die out at the expiration of the legal protection term
instead. Researchers, investigators, students, and society as a whole will suffer
the loss because the tax system fail s to encourage the dissemination of orphan
patents.
In addition, th e new law's sole focus on fu ture economic benefits imposes
heavy administrative burdens, including modified and expanded recordkeep ing
requirements, on both patent donors and charitable donees. Because the new law
allows a donor to take deductions over a period of years that will be detem1ined
based on the income derived &om the donated patent, the donor and the donee
organization must communicate with one another and the IRS for several years
following a qualified contribution.
The 2004 Act requires donors to inform charitable donees of their intent:
to treat the contribution as a "qualified intellectual property contribution" and. ·
take additional charitable deductions in subsequent years based on the income
accrued from donated patents. HI In tum, the 2004 Act requires charitable donees
to provide donors with written substan tiations explai n ing the amount of income
derived &om donated patents during the taxable year. 142 Furthermore, charitabl!!
donees must file an annual information return reporting their qualified donee
income and other specified information. 143
By a11 owing future deductions based on incom e received or accrued by the
charity &om a donated patent itself, rather than income stemming &om the
activity in which the dona ted patent is used, 144 the pew law places a difficult
burden on ch arities to track specific paten t assets. Each donated patent may
h ave a different legal protection period depending on when each was invented.
Monitoring individual patent assets and the extent to which each is generating
income is a monumental task.
Moreover, considering the future tax deductions at stake under the new law,
donors will incur substantial monitoring costs. Specifically, the new law will
require donors to expand resources to monitor the donee's income-generating
activities directly related to a specific donated patent or patents. The burden
is on the donor to come to an agreement with the donee prior to donation to
ensu re that the donee will cooperate and submit all documents relating to the
commercialization of the donated patents or financial documents to assist the
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donor in obtaini ng future deductions based on a specified percentage of the
qualified donee income. Future costs associated with these monitoring activi ties
may outweigh any future tax benefits, due to the sliding-scale nature ofthe fu ture
deduction scheme and d iscourage donors from giving patents.

PROPOSAL FOR AN ElEGIVE CHARITABLE OEDUGION REGIME

Concern over patent valuation abuses is not adequate justification for a
complete paradigm shift from a charitable deduction system that provides certain
and im mediate economic incen tives to one that provides only uncertain future
financial incentives. To prevent the foreseeable loss of dissemination of patents
for the maximum social good, it is critical that the government repeal the 2004 Act
and adopt a fair market value deduction for all intellectual property contributions.
A fair market value approach would necessarily require the imposition of strict
statutory and admin ishative safeguards to minimize the potential for valuation
conflicts, but not d iscourage valuable patent donations. Most importantly, the
government should formal ize and articulate a standard approach to determine
the fair market value of patents for charitable deduction purposes.
With respect to donations of artistic works, the government has created a
system for obtain ing fair, ob jective valuations. For example, the IRS has set up
an Art Advisory Panel. 145 Composed of twenty-five persons, including nationally
prominent art dealers, museum curators, and auction house experts, the panel
reviews and evaluates the acceptability ofartappraisals for income tax purposes. 146
The Art Advisory Panel conducts an automatic review of any work of art with a
claimed value of $20,000 or more. 147 The recommendation ofvalue by the panel
thereby becomes the IRS's positions as to valuation.l48
The IRS has also implemented a valuation safeguard procedure whereby a
taxpayer can request a "Statement of Review" for a work of art that h as been
appra ised at $50,000 or more. 149 Although significant guidelines exist for valuing
works ofart, few ~uidelines exist for valuing intellechtal property intangible assets
such as patents. 1 0 The government would necessarily have to formulate valuation
gu ideli nes to back up the fair market value approach. 15 l Such guidelines could,
for example, require appraisers of donated patents to take into consideration, and
document, the existence of related inventions or "prior art" which can decrease
a patent's value. While prior art is often overlooked by a patent examiner when
granting a patent, it should not be overlooked by an appraiser when valuing a
patent. 152
To enforce proper valuations and to prevent fraudulent or collusive behavior,
the government should require increased accountability on the part of cha ritable
donees. The government's approac h, historically, has been to place accountability
on individual and small corporate donors. Prior to the enachnent of the 2004 Act,
ifan ind ividual or small corporate donor claimed a charitable deduction in excess
of$5000, the donor was required to obtain a "qualified appraisal" for the property
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contributed, 153 obtain and attach a fu lly completed "a ppraisal summary" to the
tax return on which the deduction was first claimed (wh ich described the fair
market value of the property on the date of contribution ), 154 and maintain the
records prescribed by the regulations. 155 Further, if the IRS identified a situation
in which a taxpayer abused h is right to a charitable deduction, the taxpayer
and appraiser could be sub ject to penal ties, 156 while the charity could escape
government penalty.
While it is true that a charitable donee m ust sign and date an appraisal
summary, such an act merely acknowledges receipt of the donated property and
does not indica te that the charity agrees with the amount claimed as a deduction
by the donor. 157 Legislative reform is needed to ensure that both the donor
and charitable donee are responsible for accurate valuatio'n. 158 The govern ment
provides tax-exempt status to charitable organizations. What the government
giveth, the government can taketh away in cases of valuation abuses.
As an alternative to a system that solely provides current incentives, a char
itable dedu ction system could give donors a choice: allow them to elect to take
a single fair marke t value deduction in the year of contribution or, instead, take
futu re ded uctions based on income. Congress h as a h istory of enacting economic
stimulus provisions that allow taxpayers to elect to enjoy early the amount of
their otherwise allowed deductions to encou rage des ired behavior. For example,
the government has developed an elaborate cost-recovery system, under wh ich
taxpayers deduct th e cost of acquiring various assets over prescribed recovery
periods through appl ica ble deprecia tion and amortiza tion allowances. 159 The
goal beh in d permi tting taxpayers to take depreciation or amortization deductions:
over time is to ach ieve a fair allocation of the costs of acquiring an asset to the
period in which the taxpayer realizes income fro m the asset. 160 The government
has been willi ng to give up this tax policy goal of clear reflection of income by
creating accelerated methods ofcost recovery to incentivize taxpayer behavior for
maximum social good.
For example, to encourage acqu isitions of certain tangible p roperty for cerj
tain utilizations that would stimulate the economy, the government has au tho-'
rized more rapid cost recovery by permitting taxpayers to elect larger deduction
allowances in early years and smaller dedu ction allowances in the later years ofan
asset's statutory recovery period. 161 To provide even greater, immediate finan ciaL
incentives to taxpayers who engage in certa in acquisitive transactions, the govern
me nt has enacted provisions allowing taxpayers to elect to immedia tely expens.e
100 percent of the acquisition costs, rather th an to capita lize and deduct those ·
costs over time. 162 Consistent with its h istorical approach of incentivizing desired
behavior, the government could allow patent donors to elect to take an immediate
tax d eduction for their donations in lieu of taking fu ture tax deductions based on
income generated by the donated patent. 163
By providing an election, the proposal implicitly recogn izes that patent
donors, especially the n ew breed of donors today, are sophisticated and results
oriented . Today's donors want max imum social impact in retu rn for what they

Patent Donations and Tax Policy

461

don ate. 164 The donors want to be in control of their decisions and have choices,
su ch as to elect to take a large deduction in the year of contribution or take future,
postcontribution deductions based on incom e i n subsequent years . The donor is
the party with the intim ate knowledge about the value ofthe patent th at it wants to
donate. The p roposed election regime would allow the donor to decide whether
to incur the risks and monitoring costs associated with the future ded uctio n option
based on the value of the patent to the donee or to incur the appraisal costs and
overvaluation risks associated with the certain current deduc tion option. While
the election regim e would provide an option to donors tha t give applied resea rc h
to comm ercially-d riven donees, it would create a necessary economic incentive
to do no rs that give basic, purely scientific research to noncommercially driven
donees.

CONCLUSIO N
T he in te rsection between intellectual property and taxatio n meets at the act
ofgivin_g by the firm. Patent donation s must be encouraged for the benefit of the
firm as the dono r, the chari table organizatio n as the donee, and soc iety as the
ul ti ma te ben efactor. As econom ists have advocated, the best way to encourage
giving is not by relying solely on moral or social incentives, but by providing
strong economic incentives as we'1J. 165
·
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and useful Arts, by securing for lim ited T imes to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Righ t
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inventor, but the ownership can be transferred. See, e.g., Jerry C. Liu, Overview ofPatent
Ownership Considerations in Joint Technology Development, 2005 Syrac use Sci. & Tech.
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L. Rep. 1; William Lynch Schaller, Growing Pains: Intellectual Property Considerations for
Illinois Small Businesses Seeking to Expand, 35 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 845, 912 (2004) (stating
that only individuals can qualify as inventors for purposes of applying for patent, thus,
in order for company to own and apply for patent; "ownership of the invention must be
transferred to the company by written assignment from an individual").
38. The assignee enjoys the patent grant, which confers the right to exclude others
from making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing the patented invention. Further
more, as the assignee of inventions, a university is entitled to prosecute tl1e applications
and to make ·amendments during prosecution. See Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Knight,
321 F.3d 1111, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (affirming district court's finding iliat university
assignee may correctly prosecute and amend applications during prosecution of patetl.t.
applications).
39. Universities usually have their own patent policies. For example, a university may
embrace a policy that it owns all patents and inventions created by its employees during
their time of employmenl See, e.g., Univ. of W. Va. Bd. ofTrs. v. Van Voorhies, 34.2
F.3d 1290, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (discussing whether university's patent policy reaches
second-generation patents).
40. If the patent covers a research tool or method, the desire to have ownership
is even greater because universities cannot rely on ilie e~11erimental exception in J}i¢1~
use of the patented tool or method to further their own investigation. See Elizabeth
Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do Universities DeseN.e.
Special Treatment?, 57 Hastings L.J. 921 (2006) (arguing that universities shoo~d ·l?,e. ·.
liable for patent infringement if they use patented research tool or method in ·theh:
investigation without pem1ission in hopes that experimental exception works in th¢1t
favor).
41. See generally Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 FJd 1567, 1571
(Fed. Cir. 1997) ("(L]icenses are considered as nothing more than a promise by th~
licensor not to sue the licensee."); id. ("[Under a license agreement], title to the patent
does not change hands.... However, assignments pass title to the patentee's rights, witlt
all the accomp~nying rights of ownership, from the patentee to the assignee.''), t)nJ:lk~
assignments, patent licenses are not recorded in the Patent Office Assignment branc)l, Se~
Laurence H. Pretty, Issues of Ownership of Intellectual Property Assets Arisiryg in a Peal.
Context, 751 PLI/PAT 9, 19 (2003) (stating tl1at Patent Office "assignment record .d®,
not record patent licenses").
42. See generally Medlmmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc., 409 F.3d 1376, l3'7 9 (Ft::.il:
Cir. 2005) ("[O]nce the license agreement was in place and [licensee] was in coml¥a!i.¢ e
with the terms of the agreement, [licensee] could not be under reasonable app~ehen:s.iqt1
that it would face infringement suit by [licensorn .
43. See generally Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed . Cir. 'ZOMJ
{affirming patent infringement finding where licensee breached license agreement tha·t
included several restrictions, including prohibition of replanting second generatl:oi:i: of
seeds).
.
44. See, e.g., Mary J. Hildebrand, Software Licensing, 786 PLI/PAT 51-3; Slt..-'$3!,
(2004) (setting forth issues for consideration in software licensing); Mary M.. Sq!.irte~~
Global Licensing: A License to Use, 824 PLI/PAT 363, 367-400 (2005) (indicating:i.ar'ioi.l~;
terms and restrictions included in license to use).
.
45. See Ethan Horwitz, Patent and High Technology Ucensing, 831 PLVFA'l..:: w~
67-68 (2005) (discussing "field of use" restriction).
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46. Id. at 68-69 (discussing license term).
47. Id. at 67-68 (discussing territory restriction in patent and technology license
agreements).
48. Id. at 69 (providing reservation of rights by licensor).
49. See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 FJd 1351, 1352- 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(demonstrating Hcense use problem). Madey was a prominent researcher in the Depart
ment of Physics at Duke Uruversity and held several patents relating to th e performance of
free electron laser ("FEL") technology. Id. at 1352. After Madey was relieved from his post
at Duke, some members of the university and research collaborators used the FEL equip
ment that remained at the u niversity after Madey's departu re. ld. Subsequently, Madey
sued Duke for patent infringement. Id. The Federal Circuit rejected Duke's argument
that its nonprofit and educational status was adequate proof of the experimental exception
to infringement. Id. The court held that the infringing use was to further the university's
legitimate business objectives of: (1) educating and enlighterung faculty, researchers, and
students; (2) enhancing Duke's status; and (3) attracting additional research grants and
talented faculty and students. Id. at 1362.
50. Litigation costs include not only breach of license agreement claims, but also
patent infringement claims. See John Flock, Patent Licensing: Outlines, 825 PLIIPAT
227, 235 (2005) (stating that when licensee uses patent beyond scope of license grant,
licensee faces both breach of contract and patent infringement clairns). Likewise, in cases
relating to a licensee's use of a copyright beyond the scope ofthe license grant, both claims
of breach of con tract and copyright infringement are present. In a recent case where the
lice nsee breached the license agreement and infringed the copyrights, the jury awarded
the plaintiff$19 million in damages. See Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 271 F.
Supp. 2d 737, 741- 744 (D. Md. 2003).
51. Generally, universities with technology transfer offices focus on th e outgoing
technology licenses, where the uruversities license their innovations to the commercia] sec
tors in exchange for royalty income. See, e.g., UniversityTech nologyTransfer-Questions
and Answers, www.ucop.edu/ott/tech.htrnl (explaini ng university technology transfers and
licensing programs) (last visited Apr. 18, 2006); see also Gina C. Freschi, Navigating
the Research Exemption's Safe Harbor: Suprome Court to Clarify Scope- Implications for
Stem Cell Research in California, 21 Santa Clara Com puter & High Tech. L.J. 855, 888
(2005) ("[Technology ) transfer is the fo rmal transferring ofnew discoveries and innovation
resulting &om scientific research conducted at universities to the commercial sector.");
Amy Kapczynski, Samantha Chaifetz, Zachary Katz & Yochai Benkler, Addressing Global
Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 Berke
ley Tech. L.J. J031, 1041 (2005) ("[Through) technology transfer licenses[,] universities
negotiate with drug companies engaged in commercializing the uruversities' academic
discoveries'').
52. See University Technology Transfer, supra note 51.
53. Indeed, since un iversity technology transfer offices mainly address issues relating
to the outgoing of technology, such as disclosure, publication, and license agreements
with the private sector, tl1ey do not have enough staff to focus solely on obtaining licenses
on behalf of their researchers.
54. SeegenerallyOrtho Phann. Corp. v. Geneticslnst.,lnc., 52 F.3d 1026,1030-1035
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (explaining and contrasting rights of patent owner and licensee).
55. Intellectual property portfolios have become valuable assets and important tools
to attract investment and venture capital. See gene rally Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives
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ofMickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries of Intellectual Property LAw, 9 Va. J.L. .&
Tech. 4, 28-29 (2004) (discussing origin of property rights in information goods in face of
new digital markets for content).
56. Commentators have noted that in the world of charity giving, "donors prefe~
to avail themselves of the charitable contribution deduction." Nina J. Crimm, Through
a Post-September 11 Looking Glass: Assessing the Roles of Federal Tax Laws and Tax
Policies Applicable to Global Philanthropy by Private Foundations and Their Donors, 2.3
Va. Tax Rev. 1, 17 (2003). Thus, the incentive system centers on the availability of tax
deductions. Id. at 22 (noting that numerous studies suggest that federal tax laws impact
philanthropy); see also Charles T. Clotfelter, Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving
288 (1985); Gerald E. Auten, James M. Cilke & William C. Randolph, The Effects .d/
Tax Reform on Charitable Contributions, 45 Nat') Tax J. 267, 267 (Sept. 1992); Charle~
A. Clotfelter, Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving, in Philanthropic Giving: Studie~
in Varieties and Goals 105, 124 (Richard Magat ed., 1989); Joseph Cordes, The Cost of
Giving: How Do Changes in Tax Deductions Affect Charitable Contributions?, Emerging
Issues in Philanthro py: Seminar Series (The Urban Inst., D.C.), 2001, at 1- 3, available
at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/philanthropy..2.pdf; William C. Randolph, Dy"
namic Income, Progressive Taxes, and the Timing ofCharitabl£ Contributions, 103 J. PoL
Econ. 709, 735 (1995).
57. I.R.C. § l70(f)(2)-(3) (2006).There are exceptions, however, if the partial interest
is a charitable remainder interest in a trust. More specifically, a deduction is allowed :for
a contribution of.a remainder interest in trust if the trust is: ( l ) a charitable remainde.r
annuity trust, (2) a charitable remainder unitrust, or (3) a pooled income fund . ·rq, .§.§
170(f)(2)(A), 664(d)(l)-(2). For nontrust transfers, a deduction is allowed for a remaiqd~~
interest in personal residences or farms. Id.
It should be noted that in Notice 2004-7, the IRS stated that it "intends to disallo)lii
improper charitable deductions claimed by taxpayers in connection with the transf~r nf
patents or other intellectual property to charitable organizations." IR.S. Notice -20.0.4,..;
7, 2004-3 I.R.B. 310. Notice 2004-7 set forth four situations arising out of intellectVai:
property transfers to charitable organizations that will be closely scrutinized, including't}l~·
transfer of a nondeductible partial interest in intellectual property. Id.
Although donations of partial interests do not qualify for the income tax charil<!bl¢.
deduction, donations of"undivided interests" do qualify. I.R.C. § l 70(f)(3)(B)(i i),
58. See Rev. Rul. 2003-28, 2003-1 C.B. 594 (citing Treas. Reg.§ l.l23~Z.(IY)(~)),
The "all substantial rights" testis primarily used to help determine whethe r a patenttl':'!iis(~r
constitutes a sale (capital gains treabnent) or a license (ordinary income treatmen:f). 'rh~
test, however, is also useful in analyzing the tax treatment of a charitable donation.
59. ld. (citingTreas. Reg.§ l.l70A-l(e)).
60. Id. The regulations provide an example of a condition that is considered o:e@i~ :
gible so as to qualify for a tax deduction. Id. ("A transfers land to a city government (or,;i~ ·
long as the land is used by the city for a public park. If, on the date of the gift, the city·doe.S: .
plan to use the land for a park, and the possibility that the city will not use the l~d fo~·~ ·
publ ic park is so remote as to be negligible, A is entitled to a deduction under sectlon.IY-0
for his charitable contribution. ").
.
61. See Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,429 (19.8.3):(ruliqi :
that limited monopoly in copyright or patent "is intended to motivate the crea~ive a<;u~!fy~
of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the pu;l:>.lld·
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access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has
expired"); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind
the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individua l effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and Useful Arts."').
62. See Bcmito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)
("The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation
and avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance
in the 'Progress of Science and useful Arts."'); Sears, Roebuck 6 Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225, 229 (1964) ("Patents are not given as favors ... but are meant to encourage
invention by rewarding the inventor with the right, limited to a term of years fixed by
the patent, to exclude others from the use of his invention."); see also Peter A. Jaszi,
Goodbye to All That-A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitutionally
Grounded Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 595,
599-600 (1996) (emphasizing "economic and cultural bargain between authors and users
[are] ... at the heart of U.S. [copyright) law, as reflected in the Patent and Copyright
Clause [of the Constitution], and a parade of Supreme Court precedents"). See generally
J. H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated intellectual Property Rights:
Reconciling Freedom ofContract with Public Good Uses ofInformation, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev.
875, 897 (1999) (discussing bargain between authors and legislators).
63. The concept of "public domain" upon the expiration of the patent monopoly
was first addressed in the Singer case. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169,
196-197 (1896).
64. Indeed, the patentee has no right to collect royalties after the patent enters the
public domain upon the expiration date. See generally Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29,
33 (1964) ("[T]he exaction of royalties for use of a machine after the patent has expired
is an assertion of monopoly power in the post-expiration period when .. . the patent has
entered the public domain.").
65. Underproperty-based theoriesof the firm, the proprietary rights in the intellectual
property assets serve to coordinate and allocate intrafirm activities as well as interfirm
functions in the market. See supra note 36 and acco mpanying text. That means the role
of intellectual property is crucial to fi rms and they would not easily sever the ownership
of the intellectual property. Hence, regulations enacted to motivate and encourage firms
to sever such ownership must contemplate the value intellectual property assets provide
to the firm's functions.
66. Assignment of intellectuaJ property rights by the finn means that it will have
no title, interest, or right in the intangible intellectual property, unless the firm reserves
some of its rights by having an assignment and license-back arrangement. See Sheila J.
McCartney, Licensing Alternatives to Limit Antitrust and Misuse Exposure, 7 J. Proprietary
Rts. 10, 16 (1995) (discussing grant back practice).
67. I.R.C. § 170 (2006); see Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74~407, § 102(o),
49 Stat. 1014, 1016 (1935) (allowing charitable ta.x deduction for contributions by corpo
rations); Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917)
(allowing charitable tax deduction for contributions by individuals).
68. Tile government lost an estimated $145 billion in federal revenues from 2001
to 2005 as a result of the generaJ charitable tax deduction provision. John D. Colombo,
The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contribution Deduction: Integrating
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Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 657, 658 (2Q0l),
The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that total forgone tax revenues from the chaP
i!·able deduction will be $228.5 billion between 2005 and 2009. See Andrew Chamberlain
& Mark Sussman, Charities and Public Goods: The Case for Reforming the Federal lp~
come Tax Deduction for Charitable Gifts 2 (Tax Found. , Special Report No. 137, 2005),
available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/publications/show/119l.html.
..
69. See Colombo, supra note 68, at 682 (explaining that timing of amendments to
section 170 charitable deduction provision suggests that government was seeking "volun,
tary transfers from private sector ... to fund needed social programs"); Mark P. Gergen, The
Case fora Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1393, 1397 (1988) (explaim
ing subsidy theory); Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspectiv.e,
50 Mo. L. Rev. 85, ll5- ll6 (1985).
·
70. See Joannie Chang, Jennifer I. Goldberg & Naomi J. Schrag, Cross-Border Cirar.
itabk Giving, 31 U.S.F. L. Rev. 563, 566 (1997) (theorizing that charitable contribution~ .
should not be taxed, as they "relieve governmental btudens"); Daniel Halperin, A Chaii<
table Contribution ofAppreciated Property and the Realization ofBuilt-in Gains, 56 T;IX
L. Rev. l, 7 (2002) (explaining that one advantage of charitable deduction is that it gives:
donor-taxpayer direct control over donation, rather than forcing him to rely on Congress'l
choice of donee). But see Chamberlain & Sussman, supra note 68, at 1 (questioniog
which groups should qualify as "charitable organizations" for purposes of charitable ta~ .
deduction).
71. See Chang et al., supra note 70, at 567 (citing James J. McGovern, The Exempt"ion ·
Provisions ofSubclw.pter F, 29 Tax Law. 523, 526 (1976); Edward H. Rabin, Charitali(~
Trusts and Charitable Deductions, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 912, 920-925 (1966)).
72. I.R.C. § 170.
73. Rev. Rul. 83- 104, 1983-2 C .B. 46. Accordingly, if a donor receives a quid pro quo
for a transfer to a charity, there is no "contribution" and, hence, no charitable deductio.r),
allowed.
74. Treas. Reg.§ l.l70A-1(g) . The apparent rationale for disallowing a deduction
for the rendition ofservices is the administrative difficulty attendant upon determining th·i\
fair market value of personal service donations. See, e.g., Holmes v. Comm'r, 57 T .C. 43.1J,: ..
·435 n.3 (1971). As another justification, the value of such services rendered has not been .
taken into account for tax purposes (e.g., included in income). Treas. Reg.§ l.61- 2(c). I~
should be noted that unreimbursed expenses incurred incidental to the rendition of Nth
services may, however, constitute a deductible charitable contribution. Id. § 1.170A-l (g};
75. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2). Other classifications include : federal, state, or local goy~rth·
mental entities; certain war veterans' organizations; domestic fraternal societies, orders,
or associations operating unde r the lodge system; and nonprofit cemetery companies and
corporations.ld. § 170(c)(l ), (c)(3)-{5).
76. See Rev. Rul. 58-260, 1958-1 G.B. 126 (''The fair market value of an undivide.d..
interest in a patent, which is contributed by the owner of the patent to an organjz~"
tion described in Section 170(c) ... constitutes an allowable deduction as a charitabl~··
contribution, to the extent provided in Section 170, in the taxable year in which the prC!P.? ·
erty what contributed."); see also H.R. Rep. No. 91- 413, at 53 (1969), reprinted inH6!}'
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1699 (providing that taxpayer who contributed appreciated prope#'.
to charity was allowed deduction for fair market value of property); Treas. Reg. § 1.170/).:?._.
t(c) ("'fa charitable contribution is made in property other than money, the amount:q.£
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the contribution is the fair market value of the property at the time of tl1e contribution
reduced as provided in section 170(e)( I )....").
77. See Ron Layton & Peter Block, IP Donations: A Policy Review 5 (2004), available
at http://www.iipi.org/reports/IP..DonationsYolicy_Review.pdf.
78. The primary patent donors are large corporations witll major research and devel
opment departments, including Dow Chemical, Proctor and Gamble, Boeing, Caterpillar,
and Eastman Chemical. Id. at 6. The primary patent donees are universities that have the
remaining capacity to exploit patents. I d.
79. Id.
80. On October 22, 2004, President Bush signed into lawthe American Jobs Creation
Actof2004. AmericanJobs CreationActof2004, Pub. L. No.l08-357, 118 Stat.l418. This
Act is a hybrid ofvarious versions that had been introduced earlier. For earlier versions, see
S. 1637, l08tl1 Cong. § 49 5(b) (2004) (limiting initial charitable tax deduction to donor's
tax basis in donated intellectual prope rty, but allowing don.or to receive from charity up
to 50 percent of any royalties received by charity with respect to donated intellectual
property); S. 2103, 108th Cong. § l(b) (2004) (limiting initial charitable tax deduction to
donor's tax basis in donated intellectual property, but allowing fair market value deduction
for "qualified contributions" to "qualified research organization" (e.g., technology gifts to
charities that appl y their expertise to scientific and commercial development}}.
81. H.R. Rep. No . 108- 548 (2004). The new legislation does not apply to self
created copyrights, described in I.R.C. §§ l22l(a)(3), l23l(b)( l )(C) (2002), because, as
noted below, the 1969 legislation previously eliminated the fair market value standard for
self-created copyrights. See infra notes 99- 100 and accompanying text. Furtl1ermore, tlle
new legislation also does not apply to off-tlle-shelf computer software described in I.R.C.
§ 197(e)(3)(A)(i).
82. I.R.C. § 170(e)(l)(B) (as amended by 2004 Act). The new provision applies
to charitable contributions of intellectual property made after June 3, 2004. H.R Rep.
108-548.
83. For example, section 174 ofthe Code permits a taxpayer to immediately deduct
research or experimental expenditures. l.R.C. § l74(a). Research or experimental expen
ditures are broadly defined as "expenditures incurred in connection with the taxpayer's
trade or business which represent research and development costs in the experimen
tal or laboratory sense" and generally include "all costs incident to the development
or improvement of a product." Treas. Reg. § 1.174-Z(a)(l) (emphasis added). Expen
ditures are incurred in tl1e "experimental or laboratory" sense if they are incurred in
"activities intended to discover information that would eliminate uncertainty concerning
tlle development or improvement of a product" Id. The regulations under section 174
specifically provide that the costs of obtaining a patent are research and experimental
expenditures. Id. Such costs include not only expenses incurred in creating patentable
technology, but also attorneys' fees in the prosecution ofpatent applications. Id. (emphasis
added).
84. I.R.C. § 170(m)(3).
85. Id.
86. Id. (emphasis added). Temporary regulations issued under section 170 do not
elaborate on this definition of "qualified donee income." Section l 70(m)(lO)(D)(ii) sug
gests, however, that income arising from the charity's use of the donated property in
its exempt activities (as opposed to royalties from licensing the property) does not give
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rise to qualified donee income. Id. § l70(m)( IO)(D)(ii). As noted by one commentator:
"[A]pplying the definition of qualified donee income is likely to prove difficult in many
circumstances." Kevin Shortill, New Rules for Charities Receiving Certain Contributions
o{Intellectual Property, 2005 EOT 30- 14, July 27, 2005, at 4.
87. IR.C. § 170(m)(9) (stating that additional deductions are not allowed for do
nations to private foundations, other than private operating foundations or certain other
foundations described in LR.C. § 170(b)(l)(E)).
88. ld. § 170(m)( l), (7).
89. The amended statute provides that the additional deductions are limited to twelve
years after the contribution. Id. § 170(m)(IO)(C)- (D). 11us twelve-year limitation seem~
to be in conflict with another rule providing that additional deductions are limited to
the legal life of the intellectual properly, or ten years after the date of the contribution,
whichever occurs first. ld. § l70(m) (5)- (6).
90. Id. § l70(m)(7).

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. § l70(m)(2).
94. Id. § l70(m)(6).
95. Id. § 170(e)(l)(B)(iii), 170(m).
96. See Jobs and Growth Tax ReliefReconciliationActof2003, S. 6457, 108th Corig.
(2003) (noting "widespread abuse involving donations of patents and similar property;'); ·
S. Rep . No. 108-192, at 218 (2003) (noting concern that intellectual property donors "are
taking advantage of the inherent difficulties in valuing such property and are preparing
or obtaining erroneous valuations"}; see also I.R.S. Commissioner Testimony: Charitabl~
Giving Problems and Best Practices, IRS News Release, June 22, 2004, at 14-15, available.
at http:/l/www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-04-08l.pdf ("A key issue in intellectual property d.D-' .
nations, as in all other property donations, is whether the property has been appropriately
valued. In the case of patent and other intellectual property donations in particular, we
have concems about over valuations, whether consideration has been received in return;
and whether oqly a partial interest of property is being transferred.'').
97. See infra n.ote 99 and accompanying text.
98. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1 70A-l(c)(2) (2005) .
99. Tax ReforrnAct ofl969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a), 83 Stat. 487,555. Whethe~
a reduction in the amount of the contribution of appreciated property (from fair markef
val ue to cost basis) occurred depended on the character ofgain that would be reco~i.ted. ·
on a hypothetical sale of the properly by the donor. If the gain on a hypothetical sale b.y· .
the donor wou ld be characterized as long-term capital gain, th e amount ofthe deductio~ ·
was not reduced (e.g., the amount ofthe donor's contribution was equal to the property'S. .
fair market value). If, however, the gain on a hypothetical sale would be ordinary incom.{
or short-term capital gain, the amount of the deduction was reduced by the amount of
that lurking ordinary income or short-term capital gain. I.RC. § l 70(e)(l)(A). The 1969.
amendment affected the deduction of copyright donations by copyright creators, becaus·~
copyrights produced by donors are excluded from the definition of "capitll asset" and, 'if
sold, produce ordinary income. ld. §§ 122l(a)(3), 1231(b)(l)(C).
·
100. For example, "qualified creative expenses" incurred by certain authors and arli~~
in producing manuscripts and works of art are deductible. I.RC. §§ 162, Z63A(h). A.
"qualified creative expense" is any expense paid or incurred by an individual in the tra:d·¢;.
or business of being a "writer," "photographer," or "artist," which, except for the unifornl.
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capitalization rules of section 263A, would be otherwise deductible for the taxable year.

Id. § 263A(h)(2).
101. This is because if the donor had sold the patent, the gain would be treated
as long-term capital gain under either section 1235 (special characterization provision
applicable to patents) or sections 122l/l23l (general characterization provisions}. See
I.R.C. § l235(a) (providing long-term capital gain treatment for transfers ofall substantial
rights to patents by statutorily defined "holder" of the patent).
102. For patent donation activity prior to the 2004 Act, see supra notes 77- 79 and
accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 10-13, 26-31 and accompanying text (discussing increasing
importance and val ue ofpatents) .
104. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Smith v. Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427 (1981) (concluding that
value of donated patent was $3500, although patent donor claimed charitable deduction
in excess of$200,000).
106. The Commissioner ofthe IRS stated in a news release:
[I)t is important for taxpayers considering donations of patents or other intellec
tual property to focus on the limitations of the deductions.... We're seeing an
increasing number of deductions that don't pass the smell test. Donations that
are overly inflated or made with strings attached are going to receive increased
scrutiny.

Treasury Issue Notice Regarding Improper Deductions for Charitable Contributions of
Patents and oth£r Intellectual Property, IRS News Release, Dec. 22, 2003, at 1, available
at http://www. irs.gov/newsroom/article/O,id= 118 864,00.html.
107. I.R.S. Notice 2004- 7, 2004-3 I.R.B. 310. Notice 2004-7 sets forth the following
four situations arising out of intellectual property transfers to charitable organizations
that will be closely scrutinized: ( l) the transfer of a nondeductible partial interest in
intellectual property, (2) the donor's expectation or receipt ofa benefit in exchange for the
contribution, (3) inadequate substantiation of the contribution, and (4) overvaluation of
the intellectual property being transferred. ld. In addition to its warning to taxpayers, the
Notice also sends a warning to promoters and appraisers that certain behavior will no longer
be tolerated. Id. It states that the IRS will review promotions and appraisals of intellectual
property when it scrutinizes suspect donations. ld. If the IRS identifies a situatio n in
which a taxpayer abused his right to a charitable deduction, the taxpayer, promoter, and
appraiser may all be subject to penalties. Id.; see I.R.C. §6662 (penalty provision applicable
to taxpayers); id. §§ 6694, 6700, 6701 (pena lty provisions applicable to appraisers and
promoters).
108. I.R.S. Notice 2004- 7, 2004- 3 I.R.B. 310.
109. See supra notes 80-95 and accompanying text for a summary of the 2004 Act.
110. An earlier version of the 2004 Act, which limited the initial deduction to the
donor's tax basis, was expected to raise $385 million per year. See Brenda Sandburg,
I.RS Tweaks Rules for Patent Donations, http://www.ljnoniine.com/publlin-patent/4_9/
news/141878-l.html (Jan. 1, 2004) (describingimpactofS . 1637). T he government savings
are a bit mislead ing, however. If private charitable giving declines as a result of the
2004 Act, the government will need to provide increased direct subsidies to charities in
response.
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111. Under the prior law, it seems that owners could donate their intellectual property
"inventories" and enjoy incredible tax advantages by attempting to wipe out a substantial
amount of income by donating a sufficiently large portion of their intellectual property
holdings. Currently, however, the Code imposes various ceilings on the total amount that
a donor may deduct in any given year. I.R.C. § 170(b). For example, donations made by
individuals directly to public charities are deductible to the extent that such contributions
do not exceed 50 percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. lei § 170(b)( 1)(A),
(b)(I)(F). Donations made in trust for public charities or for the use of private charities
are generally subject to a general limitation of 30 percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross
income for the year. l d. § 170(b)( I )(B)(i). For ceilings on gifts of appreciated capita l gain
property, see id. § 170(b)(l)(C)(i), (b)( I)(D)(i). Contributions in excess of any of these
ceilings are permitted to be carried over to the five succeed ing years. Id. § 170(b)( l )(B),
(b)(1)(C), (b)(l}(D)(ii), (d)( I ).
112. The 2004 Act does not affect donations of copyrights by their creators, as those
donations were targeting by the 19691egislation. As noted above, the 1969 Act reduced
the amount of a charitable deduction for copyright donors from fair market va lue to tax
basis in the donated copyright See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text The 2004
Act achieves horizontal equity by treating copyright donors and patent donors the same.
This Article argues, however, that the 2004 Act went in the wrong direction in achieving
horizontal equity.
113. See Layton & Bloch, supra note 77, at 6.
114. American Jobs Creation Act of2004: Law, Explanation and Analysis 432 (CCH
Inc. 2004) (quoting association's comments regarding earlier, similar version of bill).
11 5. See Sttpra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
116. For the effect of the 1969 Act, see Douglas J. Bell, Changing I.R.C. §
I70(E)(J)(A): For Art's Sake, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 536, 547 (1987); Wj]Jiam A.
Dren nan, Charitable Donations of Intellectual Property: The Case for Retaining the Fair
Market Value Deduction, 2004 Utah L. Rev. 1045, 1127 (2004) (providing chart showing
decline in copyright donations by copyright creators); Pamela J. Lajeunesse, Tax Incentives
for Support ofthe Arts: In Defense ofthe Charitable Deduction, 85 Dick. L. Rev. 663, 668
n.27 (1981); Larry D. McBennett et al.,Art Update: Tax Deductions for Self-Created Works
of Art, 30 Fed. B. News & J. 342, 342-343 (1983).
117. S. 1889, 108th Cong. (2003) (imparting Senator Patric k Leahy's statements
introd ucing Artist-Museum Partnership Act of 2003); see also ACF Newsource, Artists'
Gift, www.acfnewsource.org/artlartists.gift.h!ml (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
118. See Lajeunesse, supra note 116, at 668 n.27.
119. See S. 1889;seealsoACFNewsource,supra note 117;Association ofArt Museum
Directors, Statement for the Record, http://www.aamd.orgladvocacy/artistsdeduction.php
(June 14, 2001).
120. See Lajeunesse, supra note 116, at 668 n.27.
121. See McBennett et al., supra note 116, at 342-343 (discussing music composer
Igor Stravinsky who sold papers to private foundation in Switzerland instead of donatin.g
then,1 to Music Division of Library of Congress); see also S. 1889; ACF Newsource, ruprd
note 117; Association of Art Museum Directo rs, supra note 119.
122. See Drennan, supra note 116, at 1082- 1083.
123. ld.
124. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
125. See Fred Stokeld, EO Provisions in Bush Budget Aimed at Stopping Abuses, 102
Tax Notes 699, 700 (2004).
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126. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 198 (2006) (providing special expendihtre of environmental re·
mediation costs); id. § 174 (providing immediate deduction for researc h and experimental
expend itures); id. § 179 (providing election to expense certain depreciable business assets);
id. § 179A (providing deduction for clean-fuel vehicles and certain refueling property); id.
§ 179B (providing deduction for capital costs incurred in complying with Environmental
Protection Agency sulfur regulations); id. § 181 (providing special treatment for certain
qualified film and television production expenses); id. § I90 (providing special treatment
for expenditures to remove architectural and transportation barriers to handicapped and
elderly).
127. See supra notes 2, 83.
128. T he government has enacted various capitalization and cost recove ry rules to
achieve a fair allocation of the costs ofcreating or acquiring an asset to the period in which
the taxpayer realizes income from the asset. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 263, 263A (requiring
capitalization of certain creation and acquisition costs); id. §§ 167, 168, 197 (permitti ng
depreciation or amortization ded uctions for cap italized costs); see also Comm'r v. Idaho
Power Co., 418 U.S. I, 11-12 (1974) (explaining purpose ofcost recovery system). In addi
tion, the government has provided several exceptions for certain c reation and acquisition
expenditures. See, e.g.,I. R.C. § 174.
129. Many costs incurred in computer software development are not experimental
or investigative in a laboratory sense and fail to satisfy the uncertainty test u nder section
174. For example, the costs of developing rou tine accounting, management information,
billing, or payroll systems involve no uncertainty with respect to the software design or
capability. Hence, these costs would not qualify as section 174 research and experimental
expenditu res. See I. R.C. § 174. Likewise, costs to produce documentation for mai ntaining
and describing computer software would not qualify.
130. Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000-52 I.R.S . 60 1. This revenue procedure updated the
IRS's prior pronouncement on the deductibility of computer software costs, Rev. Proc.
69-2 1, 1969- 2 C.B. 303, by integrating changes resulting from the 1993 enactmen t of
sections 167(f) and 197 ofthe Internal Revenue Code. ld.
131. This defi nition provides: "For the purpose of this reven ue procedure, 'computer
software' is any program or routine (that is, any sequence of machine-readable code) that
is designed to cause a computer to perform a desired function or set of functi ons, and
the doc ume ntation required to describe and maintain that program or ro utine.. .." Rev.
Proc. 2000-50, 2000- 52 I.R.S. 601. Because the government defined "computer software"
so broadly, Revenue Procedure 2000-50 applies not only to software development costs
that would othetwise constitute "research and experimental expenditures" under section
174, but, more importantly, also to software develop ment costs that do not satisfy the
definition of "research and experimental expenditures" under section 174. See id. Thus,
Revenue Procedure 2000- 50 may permit tl1e immediate deduction ofcomputer software
development costs, even where section 174 does not apply.
132. Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks Regarding
lntellech.Jal Property Rights at Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Eco
nom ic Summit (Feb. 27, 2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/2004/200402272/.
133. Horizontal equity 'is the principle that persons in like circumstances should be
taxed equally. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, The Logic ofTax: Federal Income T ax Theory
and Policy 55, 88 (1989).
134. "Basic (aka fundamental or pure) research is driven by a scientist's cu
riosity or interest in a scientific question." Lawrence Berkeley Labs, What Is Basic
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Research?,
http://www.lbl.gov/Education/ELSl/Frames/research-basic-defined-f.htmJ
(last visited Apr. 10, 2006) [hereinafter What Is Basic Research?]. "Applied research is
designed to solve practical problems of the modern world, rather than to aqcquire (sic]
knowledge for knowledge's sake." Lawrence Berkeley Labs, What Is Applied Research?,
http://www.lbl.gov/Education/ELSI/Frames/research-applied-defined-f.html (last visited
Apr. 10, 2006). The dichotomy of basic versus applied research has been a subject of
controversial debate. Questions relating to the purpose ofeach type of research, the lack
of funding availability for basic research, and the growth of indushy funding to finance
applied research are at the heart of the debate. See Lawrence Berkeley Labs, Basic K
Applied Research, http://www.lbl.gov/Ed ucation/ELSI!research-main.html (last visited
Apr. 10, 2006).
135. On the other hand, basic research has "no obvious commercial value to the
discoveries that result from basic research" because the main motivation is "to expand
man's knowledge." What Is Basic Research?, supra note 134.
136. Id. ("People cannot foresee the future well enough to predict what's going to de
velop from basic research. If we only did applied research, we would still be making better
spears."). Other commentators, such as C .H. Llewellyn Smith, former Director-General
of CERN, have argued that "governments have a special responsibility to fund basic
science while applied science can generally be left to industry." C.H. Llewellyn Smith,
What's the Use of Basic Science?, http://public.web.cem.ch/public/Content/Chapters/
AboutCERN/WhatlsCERN/BasicScience/BasicScience2/BasicScience2-en.html (last
visited Apr. 10, 2006).
137. Moreover, universities that have the facilities and resou rces still devote rntich
of their efforts to many valuable "innovations that fail to generate substantial incm:ne
returns but nevertheless advance the greater public good and are therefore commensurate
with university missions." BethLynn Maxwell, Patrick Turley, John Warren & Natalie J.
Wright, Overview of Licensing Technology from Universities, 762 PUlPAT 507, 513~514
(2004).
138. Moreover, mostnonorphan patents owned by universities do not directlygenerate
much income. Kapczynski et al., supra note 51, at 1088 (stating that university technology
offices' management of patents "tend to remain money-losing endeavors"). Kapczynski,
et al. further observes:
The number of schools that make money from technology transfer is small,
and those that profit tend to do so from a limited number of highly successful
patents. Licensing revenues are typically equivalent to just 4% of a muve~ity.'s
research funds, and this figure decreases significantly when the costs of patent
and license management, as well as the inventors' share of royalty income, are
subtracted. When patent royalties are compared to total university revenue, they
appear quite small, constituting only 0.5 to 2% ofrevenues, even for the subset
of w1iversities that are patent-productive.
Id.

139. See Burk, supra note 36, at 8 (explaining that firms, as holders of inte)h;ct!i:lil
property assets, possess knowledge and capability to coordinate development and exploi~
proprietary rights).
140. Id.
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141. I.R.C. § l 70(m)(8)(B) (2006) (as amended by 2004 Act); H.R. Rep. No. I 08
755, § 882 (2004), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.CA.N. 1341. In May 2005, the IRS
released new guidelines concerning the notification requirements that donors must follow
to claim additional deductions for contributions of qualified intellectual property. I.R.S.
Notice 2005-41, 2005-23 I.R.B. I. Under Notice 2005-41, donors of qualified intellectual
property must deliver to the charitable donee, at the time of donation, a written statement
containing: ( I) the name, address, and taxpayer information of the donor; (2) a description
of the qualified intellectual property in enough detail that it can be identified by the
donee; (3) the date of the charitable contribution; and (4) a statement saying tl1at the
donor intends to treat the contributi on as a quali fied intellectual properly contribution
under section l 70(m) and section 60501. Id. The IRS has asked for public comment on
Notice 2005-41. See Comment Request for Notice 2005-41 ,70 Fed. Reg. 32706 {June 3,
2005).
142. I.R.C. § 6050L(b).
143. Id. ("[E]ach donee with respect to a quali.6ed intellectual property contribution
shall make a return ... with respect to each specified taxable year of the donee showing
(A) the name, add ress, and TIN of the d?nor, (B) a description of the quaJified intellectual
properly contributed, (C) the date of the contribution, and (D) the amount of net income
of the donee for the taxable year which is properly allocable to the qualified intellectual
property"). In May 2005, the IRS published proposed regulations, simultaneously released
as temporary regulations, which provide guidance for the filing of information returns
by recipients of qualified intellech1al property contributions. See Information Returns by
Donees Relating to Quali.6ed Intellectual Property Contributions, 70 Fed. Reg. 29 460,
(May 23, 2005) (to be codified at 26 C .F.R. pt. 1) (proposed regulations); T.D. 9206, 70
Fed. Reg. 29450--01 (May 23, 2005) (temporary regulations). The regulations, effective
May 23, 2005, affect charitable donees receiving net income from qualified intell ectual
property contributions made after June 3, 2004. Under the regulations, a charitable donee
is required to file an information return any taxable year of the donee that includes any
portion of the ten-year period beginning on the date of tlle contribution, but not for taxable
years after the expiration of the legal life of the qualified intellectual property. Temp. T reas.
Reg.§ 1.6050L-2T(a) (2005). The return must be filed on or before the last day of the first
full month following the close of the donee's taxable year. ld. § l.6050L-2T(d)(2). See
I.R.C. § 770l (a)(23) (defining "taxable yea r"). The information required to be provided
on the return includes: (1) the name, address, taxa ble year, and identification number
of the donee; (2) the name, address, and taxpayer identification number of the donor;
(3) a description of the qualified intellecb.1al property; (4) tlle date of the contribution;
(5) the amount of net income of the donee for the taxable year that is properly allocable to
the q ualified intellectual property; and (6) such other information as may be specified by
the form or its instructions. Temp. Treas. Reg.§ 1.60501.r-2T(b)(l )-(6). The donee must
provide a copy of the information return to the donor of the property on or before the date
the donee is required to file the retu rn with the IRS.Jd. § 1.60501.r-2T(c)( l ).
TI1e IRS issued (and asked for public com ment on) new Form 8899, on which
charitable donees will report qualified donee income. See Comment Request for Form 8899,
70 Fed. Reg. 37006 (June 27, 2005). Th e donee must provide a copy of the information
return to the donor. l.R.C. § 6050L(c), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 882(c)(l)
(2004).
144. J.R.C. § 170(m)(3) (amended by 2004 Act).
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145. Anne-Ma rie Rhodes, Big Picture, Fine Print: The Intersection ofArt and Tax, 26
Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 179, 197 (2003) (describing the panel).
146. The Art Advisory Panel conducts an automatic review of any work of art with
a claimed value of $20,000 or more. Id. at 197. The Art Advisory Panel works in closed
meetings so as to protect taxpayer privacy and ensure objectivity and reviews works in
alphabetical order by artist so as to minimize recognition of a taxpayer's collection. Id.
147. See id.
148. The Panel recommendation is reviewed by the Appraisal Service Office and then
sent to the IRS. In 2003, the Panel reviewed 637 works of a rt with an aggregate claimed
valuation over $200 mill ion. The panel recommended ad justme nts on 5l percent of the
reviewed appraisals (total adjustments equaled $68 million). Art Advisory Panel of the
Comm'r of the Internal Revenue, Annual Summary Report for 2003 (2003).
149. Rev. Proc. 96-15, 1996-1 C .B. 627. The statement can be requested after the
donation but before the filing of the tax return reporting the transfer and must be submitted
with a qualified app raisal and appropriate user fee. Id.
150. SeeParkwoodCorp. v. Comm'r, 9T.C.M. (CCH) 748 (1950). For IRS guidelines
on valuing intangibles, see Rev. Rul. 79-432, 1979-2 C.B. 289; Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-l
C.B. 237 (providing methods of valuing intangibles of a business).
151. See, e.g., Drennan, supra note 116, at 1093-1106 (reco mmending special con
siderations when valuing patent, and describingpossible modifications to current val uation
mles).
152. See Patent Sting, New Scientist, Oct. 18, 2003, at 6.
153. Treas. Reg.§ Ll70A-l3(c)(1), (c)(2)(i)(A) (1996). For the definition of" qualified
appraisal," see Treas. Reg. § J.l70A- 13(c)(3).
154. Id. § l.l70A-13(c)(l), (c)(2)(i)(B). For the definition of"appraisal summary,"
see id. § l.l 70A- l3(c)(4).
155. Id. § 1.170A- l3(c)(2)(i)(C).
156. See I.R.C. § 6662 (2006) (donor penalty provision); id. §§ 6694, 6700, 6701
(appraise r penalty provisions).
157. Treas. Reg.§ l.l70A-13(c)(4).
I 58. Although charitable donees should have increased accountability, the govern.7
ment should also continue to impose restraints on donors, but apply such restraints equ.i
tably to all donors of intellectual property. As discussed above, the restraints historically
imposed on donors (e.g., the requireme nt to .obtain qualified app raisal and attach an ap~
praisal summary) were imposed only on individuals and small corporations. Any res.trai ni:S.
to minimize valuation conflicts should be imposed on corporate donors as well.
159. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 167 (authorizing cost recovery ded uctions, such as depreciation
and amortization allowances, for certain types of property); id. § 168 (prescribing depre,
ciation methods and applicable recovery periods for depreciable tangible property); id. ·~
197 (providing ratable, fifteen-year amortization method for "section 197 intangibles").
160. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, ll-12 (1974) (explaining
purpose of cost recovery system).
161. The default "applicable depreciation method" for most tangible property is the: .
200 percent declining balance method (which permits more rapid cost recovery tha!li fot
example, the straight-line method). I.R. C. § l68(b)(l). Section 168(k), enacted in ZQQ~f.
allowed a pu rchaser of"qualified property" to take an additional cost recovery dedu.cliO:~
equal to 30 percent of the property's cost in the first year (commonly known as "addition~!'
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first year depreciation"). Id. § l68(k)(l ). In 2003, section l68(k) was amended to allow a
taxpayer to elect to increase the amount of the additional fi rst-year cost recovery deduction
under section 168(k)(l) to 50 percent of the cost of" qualified property" (commonly known
as "50% bonus depreciation"). Id. § l68(k)(4). As a result of these immediate financial
incentives, a taxpayer who purchased qualified property, otherwise recoverable over long
statutory recovery periods, could elect to immediately deduct 50 percent of the cost in
the first year and deduct the unrecovered remaining 50 percent over time through the
applicable depreciation method.
162. Section 179 of the Code, for example, allows taxpayers to elect to deduct currently
the cost of acquiring certain depreciable business assets (e.g., computers, equipment, and
off-the-shelf software) ratl1er tl1an deduct those costs over statutorily prescribed recovery
periods. Id. § l79(a). The maxin1llm allowable deduction for all qualifying property placed
in. service is $100,000 (for taxable years beginning after 2002 and before 2010). Id. § 179(b)
(as amended ). The $100,000 amount is reduced dollar-for-dollar (but not beJow zero) by
the amount by which the cost of qualifying property placed in service d uring the tax year
exceeds $4{)0,000 in the case oftaxable years beginning after 2002 and before 2010. Id.
163. The examples provided above deal with tangible property acquisitions. Another
example relates to research and development. Section 174 aJlows taxpayer to elect either
(l) to deduct research and development costs in the year paid or incurred or (2) to defer
and amortize ratably such costs over five years. I.R.C. § l74(a)-(b).
164. See supra notes 13- 17 and accompanying text (describing new breed of donors).
165. See generally Steven D. Levitt & Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics: A Rogue
Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything 19- 23 (2005) (discussing tluee basic
flavors of incentive-economic, social, and moral - and noting that "[v]ery often a single
incentive scheme will include all tluee varieties"; also noting problems with substituting
one incentive for another, which "can produce drastic and often unforeseen results").

